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Abstract
A two−agent model of international trade with oligopoly and increasing returns is proposed
to address why there have been persistent anti−trade−liberalization movements. It is shown
that all of a country's residents lose from trade under certain conditions on the cross−country
cost structure.
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Globalization is a keyword that describes the contemporary world. Focusing on interna-
tional trade, multilateral trade liberalization has been promoted by the General Agree-
ment on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization
(WTO).
While the developed countries have been advocating the beneﬁts of trade liberaliza-
tion for developing countries and the rest of the world, some political groups and lead-
ers strongly resist in the tide of globalization. As is well known, big anti-globalization
demonstrations were performed at the places of the recent WTO new round talks. Such
movements have made Stiglitz (2002, p. 248) conclude that “for millions of people glob-
alization has not worked. Many have actually been worse oﬀ ¢¢¢”.
Why is there such a resistance? The fear of giant ﬁrms in developed countries associ-
ated with free trade is often emphasized. However, the existing literature has not replied
to this question properly by concentrating on deriving the suﬃcient condition for gainful
trade (e.g., Markusen, 1981 and Helpman, 1984) and showing the potential gainfulness of
free trade (e.g., Kemp and Shimomura, 2001). While a theory which suggests the losses
from trade is needed to improve our understanding of the above concern, there seems to
be few theoretical works that address the negative aspect of trade. Considering that the
modern standard trade theory, which is sometimes called “new trade theory”, success-
fully takes into account imperfect competition and increasing returns, one may naturally
want to know whether the trade theory can handle the negative concern of free trade.
That is the main purpose of this paper. Constructing a two-agent model of international
trade with imperfect competition and scale economies, we show an extreme possibility
that everyone in a country loses from trade.
A few remarks should be mentioned before turning to the analysis. First, in most of
the existing literature on new trade theory, a representative consumer has been assumed,
which precludes the income distributional eﬀect of the opening of trade among agents. For
example, in a seminal paper by Markusen (1981), the monopolist’s proﬁt is transferred
to the representative consumer in a lump-sum fashion. While this apparatus makes the
argument simple, it also makes it impossible to discuss the conﬂicts of interest between
the consumer and the monopolist, which we often observe in reality; the monopolist seeks
higher prices for maximizing its proﬁt, which is likely to reduce the consumer surplus. In
1this sense, it is an unexplored work to address income distributional eﬀects of free trade
in an imperfectly competitive setting.
Second, we must emphasize that the suﬃcient condition for losses from trade derived
in this paper is diﬀerent from that obtained in Markusen (1981) and Helpman (1984).
According to them, a country loses from trade only if its output of the monopolized good
decreases by moving from autarky to free trade. However, it may not be necessarily
clear under what conditions on exogenous parameters the ‘production contraction’ takes
place. It seems that there are no contributions that clearly show under what conditions
on parameters Pareto-deteriorating trade takes place in two-country general equilibrium
trade models that are subject to imperfect competition and increasing returns. This is
what we try in this paper.
Third, this paper is closely related to the literature on losses from trade in non-Arrow-
Debreu economies. For example, Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) and Shy (1988) show an
extreme situation in which everyone in all countries loses from trade in market incom-
pleteness, while Kemp and Long (1979) and Bihn (1985) do the same task in overlapping
generations models. Thus, this strand of literature has shown the negative aspects of
free trade and can provide an interesting insight on anti-globalization. However, as we
already noted, to our knowledge, there seems no parallel work in a context of imperfect
competition and increasing returns. We aim to fulﬁll this gap.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops a two-agent oligopolistic model
and characterizes an autarkic equilibrium. Section 3 extends the model to free trade and
explores the welfare consequences of the opening up of trade on income distribution of
each agent. Section 4 sums up the conclusion.
2 An Autarkic Equilibrium
A two-country (home and foreign) Ricardian model is constructed. This section is devoted
to describing autarky of the home country. There are two goods (X and Y ) both of which
are produced from labor. Good Y is taken as a numeraire and its price is normalized
to unity. On the production technology of good Y , it is assumed that one unit of labor
produces one unit of good Y so that the wage rate equals one as long as it is positively
supplied. Throughout the paper, good Y is assumed to be produced both in autarky and
in free trade.
On the other hand, producing X units of good X requires a variable cost of cX and
a ﬁxed cost of f with c and f being a positive constant. Good X is produced by a
monopolist.
One notable property of our model is that we separate the welfare of consumers from
that of monopolists to address the income distributional eﬀect of the opening of trade.
The monopolist owns a 100% ownership of the ﬁrm and no labor, whereas the consumer
owns no ownership of the ﬁrm and earns wage income only by supplying its labor. The
2monopolist is assumed to consume only good Y so that maximizing utility is equivalent
to maximizing proﬁt by controlling its output. On the other hand, the consumer seeks




subject to pDX + DY = L;
where v(¢) is a monotonically increasing function, u(¢) an increasing, strictly quasi-
concave, and homothetic function, Di;i = X;Y the consumption of each good, p the
relative price of good X, and L the home labor endowment, which is equal to the labor
income because of the unitary wage rate. Both goods are indispensable. Then, the corre-










where e(¢) is deﬁned as
e(p) ´ min
DX;DY
fpDX + DY j u(DX;DY) ¸ 1g:
An autarkic equilibrium is characterized. Since good X is monopolistically supplied,




from which the inverse demand function becomes p(X=L); p0(¢) < 0. The monopolist’s









Recall that the assumption of indispensability of both goods must involve incomplete












the solution of X=L to which can be expressed by X=L = x(c); x0(c) < 0. Substituting
it into the inverse demand function, the autarkic equilibrium price becomes p(x(c)) and
the monopolist’s equilibrium proﬁt is obtained as
¼(c;f) ´ [p(x(c)) ¡ c]Lx(c) ¡ f; (3)
1Any interested reader is referred to Wong (1995).
3which is needed to be positive for the interior maximum, i.e., the pair of (c;f) satisﬁes








Exactly the same argument holds in the foreign country as well. In what follows,
the two countries are assumed to diﬀer in the labor endowment and the monopolist’s
marginal and ﬁxed costs. Thus, one has only to replace L;c and f with L¤;c¤ and f¤ to
describe the foreign autarkic equilibrium.
3 A Free Trade Equilibrium and Losses from Trade
This section lets the two countries trade freely. Then, the market-clearing condition in




¤) = X + X
¤;
which gives the inverse demand function as p((X +X¤)=(L+L¤)) and the home monop-









The two monopolists are assumed to play a Cournot-Nash game, which gives the system






















However, the interior solution is not always chosen due to the presence of ﬁxed costs.
Roughly speaking, the home monopolist has an incentive to quit production when f is
suﬃciently large. To allow for such a possibility, let R(X¤;c) denote the solution of X














Then, making use of Π(¢), the home monopolist’s reaction function is derived as
X =
(
R(X¤;c) if Π(X¤;c;f) ¸ 0
0 if Π(X¤;c;f) < 0 : (7)
2Note the functional form of p(¢) is the same between autarky and free trade.




R(X;c¤) if Π(X;c¤;f¤) ¸ 0
0 if Π(X;c¤;f¤) < 0 : (8)
(7) and (8) imply that each monopolist’s reaction curve in the X ¡ X¤ space is not
globally continuous as Figure 1 depicts.3 In the ﬁgure, the presence of ﬁxed costs makes
the home monopolist’s reaction curve contains a vertical segment for a suﬃciently large
value of X¤, which makes its reaction curve consist of BC and DE: there is a jump in the
curve. Similarly, the foreign monopolist’s reaction curve consists of a horizontal segment
and a downward-sloping one.4
On the basis of the above argument, we now have:
Lemma. The free trade equilibrium (XN;X¤N) is characterized by foreign monopoly
such that
X
N = 0; X
¤N = (L + L
¤)x(c
¤); (9)
under the condition that
Π((L + L
¤)x(c
¤);c;f) < 0; Π(0;c
¤;f
¤) ¸ 0: (10)













Recalling the deﬁnition of the function x(¢), X¤=(L + L¤) to this equation is expressed
by x(c¤), which is equivalent to X¤N = (L + L¤)x(c¤). Then, applying the foregoing
argument yields Lemma. Q. E. D.
Roughly speaking, this lemma asserts that the world market is possibly monopolized
by the foreign monopolist when f is suﬃciently large relative to f¤. Such an equilibrium
is given by N in Figure 1. The rest of the paper will address the welfare aspects of the
above equilibrium. Since the world market is monopolized by the foreign monopolist, the
equilibrium price is equal to p(x(c¤)). Thus, we have arrived at the main result of the
paper summarized in:
Proposition. If the cost parameters satisfy c < c¤ and (10), both the consumer and
3The ﬁgure is drawn based on a linear demand function for simplicity.
4Dixit (1980) and Brander and Spencer (1981) apply a similar geometry to the theory of entry
deterrence.
5the monopolist in the home country lose from trade.
Proof. Proving the losses from trade for the monopolist is almost trivial because the
home monopolist’s proﬁt is driven to zero under free trade, whereas that under autarky
is positive from assumption.
On the other hand, the world price is now p(x(c¤)) which is larger than p(x(c)) under
the condition of c < c¤. Hence, comparing the autarkic and free trade levels of the












where the left-hand side is the indirect utility under free trade, while the right-hand side
is that under autarky. The inequality follows from the fact that v(¢) is decreasing in the
marginal cost and the assumption of c < c¤. Accordingly, both the monopolist and the
consumer in the home country are worse oﬀ under free trade than under autarky. Q. E.
D.
Remark 2. It is worth mentioning that the losses-from-trade proposition proved above
has another important implication. Kemp and Wong (1995a, 1995b) prove that there ex-
ists a lump-sum compensation scheme which makes nobody worse oﬀ in free trade than
in autarky even though the everyone in all countries loses from laissez-faire free trade.5
However, the analogy to their potential gainfulness of free trade no longer carries over to
imperfect competition and increasing returns as demonstrated in Fujiwara (2005). That
is, any lump-sum compensation scheme is ineﬃcacious in overcoming the losses from
trade arisen above. In other words, whether lump-sum compensation suﬃces to remedy
losses from trade heavily depends on the type of market distortion under consideration.
4 A Concluding Remark
This paper has presented a simply analytical framework to help understand why there
have been persistent criticisms on globalization and trade liberalization. We have shown
that there is a possibility that all of a country’s residents become worse oﬀ under free
trade than under autarky in the presence of oligopoly and increasing returns. When the
country’s monopolistic ﬁrm incurs a higher ﬁxed cost than the other monopolist, the ﬁrm
is likely to be defeated in the world market. Thus, the world market becomes foreign
monopoly and the world price can exceed the autarkic price, which reduces the consumer
surplus. As a result, both the consumer and the monopolist lose from trade.
5Kemp and Wong (1995a) prove this result in an incomplete market model, while Kemp and Wong
(1995b) do the same task in an overlapping generations model.
6However, we would like to emphasize that our losses-from-trade proposition does
not support anti-globalization movements. The implicit supposition of no redistribution
between the two agents has played a key role in deriving the result of harmful trade.
Indeed, our companion paper, Fujiwara (2005), has proved that there exists a non-lump-
sum scheme of income redistribution between the agents which makes nobody worse oﬀ in
free trade than in autarky.6 That is, one can show that trade liberalization is potentially
beneﬁcial to all agents in all countries. This ﬁnding may give a theoretical rationale for
the following argument by Bhagwati (2004, p. 233):7
So, we need to put in place those institutions and policies, part of what I call in this
book “appropriate governance”, if we are to support, and increase support for, global
integration of the poor countries, as we should.
6Prior to Fujiwara (2005), Kemp and Shimomura (2001) provide a more general proof of potential
gainfulness of trade under oligopoly and increasing returns.
7In the book cited in Introduction, Stiglitz (2002) also mentions, “I believe that globalization ¢¢¢ can
be a force for good and that it has the potential to enrich everyone in the world, particularly the poor”.
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Figure 1: The Laissez-Faire Free Trade Equilibrium
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